

A
 REVIEW
 OF THE
 STATE
 OF THE
 BRITISH NATION.

Thursday, September 25. 1707.

AND why should we not be discouraged at ill Successes this Year? Says one, are not the *French* Conquerors over us in every Place? Have they not beaten us every where? Beaten us in *Spain* and almost out of *Spain*; beaten us from *Toulon*, beaten us in the Lines, and out of the Lines at *Stolboffen*; beaten us at Sea, and beaten us on Shoar? Have they not beaten us with fighting, and beaten us without fighting; beaten us by standing by, and beaten us by running away? If you are not sensible of these things, we are sensible of them; we see how hard this War presses us, how unable we are to raise the vast Sum this War calls for every Year, how our Trade stagnates, our Poor want Employment, our Manufactures lie on our

Hands, our Merchants fail, and we decline sensibly in Wealth every Day; and we think we have Reason to be discourag'd!

Our Hope, were bent upon *Toulon*, because we saw, it would put an End to the War, and we hoped well, it would be such a Blow to *France*, as would bring him to our Hands, make him disgorge *Spain*, and answer all the Confederates Demands, and so we should once see an End of our Sorrows, and *Europe* might enjoy her ancient Tranquility and Liberty again; and if the Want of this has more than ordinarily dejected us, we think, that all things consider'd, as *Jonah* said of his Anger, *We do well to be discouraged.*

Indeed, Gentlemen, I believe you will do me the Justice to say now, I have stated the

the Case fairly ; and yet I'll undertake to prove, you have no Reason to be discouraged, tho' all you have said were true.

I'll acknowledge with you, that the *French*, whether by the meer ill Conduct of the Confederates in some Places, and by the immediate Hand of Heaven in others, have made a Campaign this Summer far more to their Advantage, than, I dare say, they expected themselves, I am very sure, more than we expected.

And not to enter too far into the melancholy Particulars ; they have really had the better of us on the *Rhine*, many Thanks to the discording, jealous, covetous and slow Members of the Empire.

They have bauk'd our Enterprize on *Thoulon*, Thanks to the pious Zeal of the Court at Vienna, who to get a Hook in the Nostrils of the Holy *Leviathan*, would not omit their *Neapolitan* Voyage to make a Conquest worth ten of it, and which if it had been made, would have drawn that along with it, as necessarily as the Loadstone does the Iron.

They have beaten us in *Spain* by fair fighting, Thanks to our *Portuguese* Allies, who joyn'd us with more Horses than Men, more Men than Soldiers, and more Soldiers than they had Money to buy Cloths for.

They have beaten us at Sea, where they have taken our Ships in the Face of our own Harbours, insulted our Commerce, and at the same time made themselves rich by an uninterrupted Trade to the *Spanish West-Indies*, which has filled them with Bullion, and which enabled them in the first of the Spring to set out their Armies, which in Winter they themselves despair'd of.

And last of all, they have had the better of us in *Flanders*, even by having the worst of us ; they have gain'd the Victory by running away, because it not being their Business to fight there, but to keep us at Bay ; their avoiding a Battle has answer'd their End, and disappointed ours, which is in one Sense a Victory.

And now, Gentlemen, before I enter into the Argument, give me leave to make one Enquiry here, on a right Solution of which will depend the Stress of the present

Case, whether we have reason to be discourag'd and dejected, or no ? The Enquiry is in short this. — Are the Advantages, the *French* have over us, obtain'd by their Power, or by their Management ; by their Forces, or their Conduct ; by their real Superiority in Strength, or by their Vigilance, Diligence and Application ? And upon this Enquiry, will turn the whole Stress of this Matter.

I fancy, I need not go far to convince you, that the *French* are far from a Superiority in Force ; and that if we were to come even to the Article of Numbers, they are not superiour, tho' they have done mighty things to recruit their Losses too : 'Tis true, in *Flanders* they appeared to outnumber us in the Beginning of the Campaign, but 'tis otherwise now ; and in other Places our Troops are more dispers'd, on the *Rhine* they are more in the Field, not because we have not Troops, but because those Troops have not been brought together ; Thanks to our Friends there.

In *Italy* we outnumber them, and in *Provence* were the Duke of *Savoy's* whole Forces together, they are much about equal in Number ; in *Spain* they outnumber us, but *Naples* and *Milan* stand against it to an Equality ; and at Sea we leave no Room for any Comparison, having kept their Fleet lock'd up in their Harbours almost all the War.

If we come to examine the Condition of the Forces, the Goodness of Troops on either side, the Fullness of the Battalions, the Mounting of the Cavalry, the Horses, the Clothing, the Pay, and above all the Men themselves ; how fed, how kept in Heart, how strong Bodies, how brave ; I believe, it is no Vanity to say, our Troops exceed theirs beyond any Comparison, and I do not undervalue them neither ; 'tis apparent they know it themselves, and upon all Occasions testify their Sense of it, by making up in Numbers the Want of Equality in their Horses and Men.

Were the Superiority of the Enemy really in their Forces, were their Troops superiour in Number, and did they overmatch us Man for Man ; were our Battalions

not

not able to stand before theirs, and did they out-shock us upon the Square; were their Cavalry better mounted, and were we in Want of Horses? Then indeed, Gentlemen, you had some Reason to be discouraged and dejected at the Affair of *Toulon*, and the Prospect of the War would look very terrible to us. But I am free to say, I make no Ostentation, when I speak of the Superiority of Forces, as to Goodness of Troops, between the Confederates and the *French*; their own Officers will acknowledge it, and if they did not, innumerable Actions would testify it.

Well, Gentlemen Complainers, if the *French* are not superiour in Force to us, where then lyes the Defect? What is the Reason we cry out of our ill Successes? How comes it that we are worsted? — I'll tell you in short, they out-dous in Conduct, in Expedition, in Vigilance, in an entire Concurrence of Parts, Persons, and Parties, to answer the End of the whole —

And what Use shall be made of this? The Answer is short, *never be discouraged*, but MEND IT. Have our Allies been deficient? Have the *Germans* neglected the *Rhine*, and betray'd their Country? Has the Emperor run after an *Italian* Project, while they left themselves too weak to carry on the Attempt upon *Toulon*? Oblige them to remedy this, and rectifie the Conduct, that has given the Enemy an Advantage —

If you will beat the *French*, you must fall on him altogether with united Force, and with jointly concerted Measures; in short, you must take the same Methods to attack *France*, as the *French* do to resist you, viz. *Vigilant watching Advantages*, *swift taking hold of them*, *exact Subordination of Parts to one another*, *direct and punctual Execution of concerted Measures*, *entire Harmony* in the Pursuit of the publick Good, and a full Conjunction of Interests. The Want of these things make the *French* beat us, when at the same time they dare not look us in the Face in the Field.

Again, if this Method is but pursu'd, the *French* may be beaten; nay, they will

be beaten, they dare not stand you in the open Field; and had Prince *Eugene* march'd into *Dauphiné*, instead of *Provence*, it would have been soon apparent, they would have stood upon the Defensive in all Places, and you might have push'd them to the Gates of *Lyons*.

O *Naples, Naples!* Thou hast put back the Confederacy a whole Year; had that Expedition been kept cold, which for the Value of it, comparatively speaking, might have been very well done; had that Army been join'd to Prince *Eugene*, he might have entered *Provence* or *Dauphiné*, where he would; and having push'd the *French* Forces quite over the *Rhone*, he had enjoy'd the whole Country, cut off *Toulon* and *Marseilles* from the rest of *France*, and in time they would have fallen of Course.

The Sum of the Matter is, instead of being discourag'd at Disappointments, let us mend the Causes. 'Tis the Management of the Confederacy, not the Forces of the Confederacy, which is our Deficiency, and in which our Disaster lyes; the Business would soon be recover'd still, if we can but bring the Emperor to a better Management, and that all the Confederates would exert themselves, as *England* and *Holland* have done — Why should not the Imperial Army, who had our Fleet to have supported them, much rather have ship'd an Army to *Catalonia*, than to *Naples*? Why not rather have invaded *Aragon* than *Provence*, and retriev'd the Honour of *Almanza*, rather than have accumulated Disasters before *Toulon*?

I might argue a little the Unreasonableness of Discouragements and Dejections; and here pray be pleas'd to bear with a few Observations.

1. It is the Delire and the Rejoycing of our home Enemies, as well as our publick Enemies, that we should have a Face of Chagrin and Melancholy put upon our People; that the Countenance of the Nation should be subdued, the People made afraid, and their Spirits dejected; that we should be terrified with dark Apprehensions, and made believe,